Using the standard nonlinear income taxation framework with heterogeneity o f preferences, this paper examines the optimality o f w orkfare as a screening tool. It is assumed that workfare does not serve as a human capital investment, participation is mandatory, and administrative costs are negligible. Imposing alternative cardinalizations on individuals utilities, allows for the possibility that the government optimally redistributes income to or from high disutility of labour individuals. Under either case, workfare is never optimal to impose on these individuals. It is also shown that non-productive w orkfare can be an e cient policy tool, in contrast to the results found in
Introduction
During the past few years, governments have increasingly instituted workfare into their welfare programs. Workfare is the conditioning of welfare bene ts, either cash or in-kind, on the ful llment of some obligation by the welfare recipients. The type of obligation can vary substantially. It can include community service jobs or similar work requirements, subsidized employment, job search activities, education, and/or job-training. In addition, workfare programs can bevoluntary, in which case individuals receive extra bene ts for participating in the program, or workfare can be mandatory, in which case individuals lose bene ts when they do not participate. Likewise, the arguments for workfare can take many forms. The most common argument is that workfare reduces the cost of redistributive programs, either by preventing long-term dependency by preserving and enhancing skills, or by reducing the numberof people on welfare by e ectively screening individuals.
In this paper, the optimality of workfare as a screening tool is examined. To do so, a narrow de nition of workfare is adopted by assuming it does not serve as a human capital investment and that participation is mandatory. Second, administrative costs of the redistributive program are assumed to be negligible. Third, it is assumed that there is an informational asymmetry between individuals and the government. 1 The government can only observe individuals private income. It is assumed that the government designs a tax/transfer schedule to achieve its redistributive objective. The informational asymmetry implies that the government m ust satisfy incentive compatibility constraints. Individuals must prefer or beindi erent between the tax/transfer bundle intended for them and all other bundles. In e ect, the government t a k es into account that individuals act optimally by taking the tax/transfer schedule as given when they make their work/leisure. As shown in the optimal taxation literature, the government is able to weaken these selfselection constraints by using nonlinear taxation. 2 The question this paper investigates is whether the self-selection constraints can also be weakened by using a non-means test, i.e., conditioning taxes/transfers on workfare.
In the standard nonlinear income taxation literature 3 , individuals only di er in ability and the government adopts either a welfarist or a non-welfarist objective function. Which objective is more realistic in the context of redistributive programs intended to help the poor is a matter of debate. However, the approach the government chooses, and the speci c objective function it adopts, has implications for the design of the optimal nonlinear tax scheme. In this paper, a welfarist approach is in taken. The government cares' only about the utility o f i n d i v i d u a l s . It selects a tax/transfer schedule to maximize a quasi-concave social welfare function de ned over individuals ' utilities. 4 This can be contrasted to a non-welfarist approach, commonly adopted in the literature (Besley and Coate (1992,1995) and Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1994) ), where the government does not give any weight to the leisure individuals forgo when they work. The government cares' only about individuals total consumption or income and any function of these variables can bea nonwelfarist objective function.
When individuals have the same preferences and their abilities are drawn from the same distribution, their welfare is an increasing function of their ability level. Therefore, a government with a symmetric quasi-concave welfarist objective function (i.e. one that bases redistribution on individual utilities) 5 will want to redistribute towards individuals 2 Stiglitz (1982) shows this in the case when the government adopts a welfarist objective function. 3 This framework was initiated by Mirrlees (1971) . 4 Varying the degree of quasi-concavity o f t h e social welfare function allows one to trace out all the relevant p o i n ts on the pareto e ciency frontier. 5 An example of a symmetric quasi-concave objective function is an isoelastic social welfare function. It takes the form of W = P N i U i 1; = , with the coe cient o f a version to inequality, 2 0 1]. If is zero, W is a utilitarian social welfare function and as tends to in nity, W becomes a maxi-min social welfare function.
at the bottom of the earning distribution. 6 In this case, four qualitative conclusions have emerged from the existing literature. First, marginal tax rates on all individuals are nonnegative. Second, the marginal tax rate of the highest earner is zero. Third, the marginal tax rate of the lowest earner is zero if all individuals are working at the optimum otherwise it is positive. 7 Fourth, the progressivity of the optimal nonlinear tax schedule is ambiguous. Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1994) show that the rst and third results can beoverturned if the government minimizes an income-based poverty index. 8 In this paper, it is shown that modifying the standard optimal nonlinear income taxation framework with a welfarist government b y allowing for heterogeneous preferences overturns both the rst and the fourth result.
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When individuals have di erent preferences, it is possible that some individuals face a negative marginal tax rate and the optimal tax schedule is regressive. The issue addressed in this paper is: given the optimal tax system is in place and individuals di er with respect to both their abilities and their preferences, is it e cient to impose workfare?
The optimality of imposing workfare in the standard nonlinear income taxation framework with a welfarist government has beenexamined by Besley and Coate (1995) , Brett (1997) , and Beaudry and Blackorby (1997) . The rst two papers show that it is e cient to use workfare to separate individuals of di ering abilities only if work requirements are productive. Under the additional assumption that individuals also have di erent unobservable home sector productivites, Beaudry and Blackorby (1997) show this result continues to hold only if individuals are more productive at workfare than they are in the formal labour market. In this paper, it is shown that non-productive w orkfare can be e cient to use when individuals are allowed to have heterogeneous preferences.
When individuals have di erent preferences, which re ect their di erent disutilities of labour, their welfare is no longer an increasing function of their ability level. The rst question to address is: which individuals will the government want to redistribute towards? It is known that an individual with a high disutility of labour will work less than an individual with a lower disutility of labour who earns the same wage, that is, individuals with a high disutility o f l a b o u r w i l l b e l o wer income earners. Does this mean the government should redistribute towards these individuals, that is, do these individuals also have a l o wer welfare? It is argued in this paper that the government m a y o r m a y not redistribute towards such individuals. On the one hand, the government could believe that low income earners deserve the support of the state, irrespective of the factors that determined their low income status. One way to think about this case is to view a high disutility of labour as some form of disability, where a disability is de ned as some`general activity limitation, possibly mental or emotional' that does not preclude participation in the labour market.
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In this case, the government wants to redistribute income to individuals with low income. On the other hand, it seems equally plausible that the government believes that some low income earners do not necessarily deserve the support of the state. It might argue that some low income earners are responsible for their low income status and therefore, the state should not transfer income to them. This case can be supported by re-interpreting a high disutility of labour as a high taste for leisure. Individuals are capable of working more, but have chosen not to, that is, they are 'lazy'. In this case, the government might n o t want to redistribute income to these individuals.
To analyze the optimality of workfare under either of these two interpretations, the disutility of labour is embedded into a general form of utility function which allows the disutility of labour to be interpreted as either disability or laziness depending on how the utility function is cardinalized. By imposing alternative cardinalizations on individual utilities, the government optimally redistributes income to or from high disutility of labour individuals depending on how i t i n terprets the disutility of labour. To highlight the results, a maxi-minimum social welfare function is adopted.
The second question can then be addressed: is workfare an optimal screening tool? Under either interpretation, it is shown that it is never optimal to impose workfare on individuals with a high disutility of labour. However, it can be optimal to impose workfare on individuals with a lower disutility of labour even if the work requirements are not productive. In addition, it is shown that when there is no workfare, individuals can have negative marginal tax rates and the tax structure can beunambiguously regressive in a speci c region. This is in contrast to the standard results of the optimal non-linear income taxation framework.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the assumptions of the model and characterizes individuals' behaviour. Section 3 then characterizes the government's problem and examines the optimality o f w orkfare under the di erent government objectives. Section 4 discusses the model's results and Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Individuals in this economy are represented by two characteristics indexed by i and j . The productive capability index i 2 f 1 2g is re ected by individuals' wage rates, w i and the disutility of labour index j 2 f hg is re ected both by individuals disutility of labour function, g j ( ) and by their utility function U j ( ). The total population in this economy is given by, N = P 2 i=1 P` h j N j i .
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11 Essentially, there are four types of individuals in this economy. This makes the problem tractable and allows us to gain insight i n to the optimality o f w orkfare given that individuals di er with respect to two unobservable characteristics, ability and taste.
Individual preferences are represented by:
where c is consumption, L is labour supplied in the private market, and d is labour required for workfare. The function U j ( ) is strictly quasiconcave implying positive marginal utility,
( ) > 0. This general functional form allows for the possibility of di erent laissez-faire utility rankings depending on the measuring scheme used for U j . Note that di ering the cardinalization of U j will not a ect the individual's underlying preferences they will only a ect how U h compares to U`. The argument i n t h e utility function has a quasilinear functional form to make t h e results comparable to those of Besley and Coate (1995) .
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The disutility of labour function, g j ( ) is assumed to be strictly convex and twice di erentiable.
Leisure is a good and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and total labour supply is greater than zero, M R S j c L = g j 0 (L + d) > 0. It is assumed that type 2 individuals are more productive in the private labour market than type 1 individuals, that is w 2 > w 1 . It is also assumed that individuals with preferences h have a higher disutility of labour or a higher taste for leisure, g
The individual's budget constraint is:
where y = w i L is income from labour supplied in private market and b is a bene t transfer, conditional on private income and possibly also on workfare.
By substituting for private labour supply, the individual's utility in terms of consumption and private income or the indirect utility function can bewritten as:
where the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and private income is equal to one over the wage rate times the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and total labour supply, M R S , and the partial derivative of the individual's indirect utility function with respect to workfare is ;M U j g j 0 ( ) < 0. The wage di erential assumption and the assumptions on U j ( ) a n d g j ( ) ensure that the indi erence curves of individuals who di er only in ability, or who di er only in tastes, exhibit the single-crossing property in consumption-income space. These assumptions are also su cient to ensure that high ability individuals are better o than their low ability counterparts at any point in consumption-income space. However, additional assumptions on U j ( ) m ust be made to assert that individuals with one type of preferences are better o at every point in consumption-income space than similarly abled individuals with di erent tastes.
If there is no welfare/workfare system in place, individuals choose consumption and private labour supply to maximize their utility (1) subject to their budget constraint ( 2 ) 
Government Policy
It is assumed that the government`cares' about the welfare of individuals and adopts a maxi-minimum social welfare function. 15 However, this model departs from the standard framework by allowing individuals to di er with respect to tastes and by introducing workfare as a policy tool. Under the rst assumption and without workfare, it is shown that the marginal tax rates on less abled individuals can be negative and that the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule can be regressive in a speci c region. It is then shown how the assumption of heterogeneity in preferences changes the results of Besley and Coate (1995) and Brett (1997) and how the results derived in this paper relate to those in Beaudry and Blackorby (1997) 
Figure 1
Laissez-Faire O u t c ome
The objective o f t h e g o vernment is to maximize the welfare of the worst-o individual subject to the self-selection constraints, non-negativity constraints on individuals private income, and its revenue/resource constraint.
The revenue/resource constraint i s given by: 
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It is assumed that the government can observe the amount of labour supplied for the given work requirements since it is imposing them. E ectively, the government can condition tax/transfer bundles on both income and the level of work requirements. If individuals di er in their ability at workfare, the government could use work requirements to identify individuals' ability. Therefore, it is assumed that individuals are equally productive at workfare. To make this assumption realistic, the productivity of workfare is given an upper bound. It is further assumed that any resources created by workfare are redistributed back into the economy.
How the government interprets individuals' preferences for labour determines how it will redistribute resources in this economy. Two alternatives are considered. First, the government c a n i n terpret a high disutility of labour as a form of disability. In this framework, the worst-o individual in the laissez-faire outcome is the low-ability, high taste
Second, the government can interpret a high disutility of labour as a high taste for leisure and as a form of`laziness' on the part of those individuals. In this case, the individual with the lowest 16 Non-productive w orkfare means w = 0 . 17 The ranking of maximized utilities in the laissez-faire outcome becomes
utility in the laissez-faire outcome is the low-ability, low taste for leisure individual, so
The question this paper addresses is: can the imposition of workfare increase the welfare of the worst-o individuals? In each of the cases considered, the government will transfer income from the high ability individuals to the worst-o individuals. As a result, high-ability individuals have an incentive to mimic. If the government imposed work requirements on these individuals, it would bothincrease their incentive to mimic, and reduce the potential revenue the government could raise. Therefore, the government will never optimally impose work requirements on the high-ability individuals. In addition, the non-negativity constraint on the high ability individuals' private income will never bind.
To examine the optimality of work requirements for the low ability individuals, it is initially assumed that the government takes the levels of workfare as given (d1 0 and Workfare is optimal to impose if this expression is positive when evaluated at d = 0. Likewise, the optimality of non-productive or productive workfare can bedetermined by evaluating these expressions at d = 0 and w = 0 or d = 0 and w > 0. To simplify the algebra, it is assumed that there are only three types of individuals, low ability individuals with high and low tastes for leisure and a high ability individual with a 18 The ranking of maximized utilities in the laissez-faire outcome becomes V`(ĉ1 ŷ1) < V h (ĉ h 1 ŷ h 1 ) < > = V`(ĉ2 ŷ2) < V h (ĉ h 2 ŷ h 2 ): 19 Welfare bene ts have been chosen optimally.
given taste for leisure. For notational simplicity, the superscript on the high ability individuals' preferences is suppressed. Their preferences are speci ed only when they become important for the results.
High Disutility of Labour as a Form of Disability
Under the interpretation that a high disutility of labour is some form of disability, the government's objective is to maximize the utility of the low-ability, high disutility of labour individuals, subject to its resource constraint, non-negativity constraints on the low a b i l i t y individuals' private income, and the self-selection constraints. In this case, the self-selection constraint b e t ween the high ability individuals and the worst-o individuals will never bind and can be excluded from the government's problem. Let , j for j =` h, and 2 be the corresponding Lagrange multipliers on the remaining constraints. The Lagrangian for the government's problem is: From the rst-order conditions on c 2 and y 2 (shown in the Appendix), the standard result that the high ability individuals face a zero marginal tax rate, M R S c 2 y 2 = 1, is derived. However, depending on the level of work requirement imposed on them, the lowability individuals can face a positive, negative, or zero marginal tax rate. If there are no work requirements, then from the strict convexity of the disutility of labour function, the high-ability individuals supply less than their laissez-faire amount o f labour to mimic the low-ability individuals with a low taste for leisure, so d M R S 2 (c1 ỳ 1 ) < 1. This implies that if the low-ability, low taste for leisure individuals earn a positive private income, `= 0, they will have a positive marginal tax rate, M R S c 1 y 1 < 1. Likewise, if the non-negativity constraint o n t h e l o w-ability, disabled individuals' private income does not bind and y h 1 ŷ1, then these individuals will also have a positive marginal tax rate.
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If bothnon-negativity constraints are slack, there can either bea separating equilibrium, or a low-ability pooling equilibrium, i.e., both type of low-ability individuals receive the same bundle. The separating outcome is illustrated in Figure 2 .
It can also be shown that if the non-negativity constraint o n t h e l o w-ability, l o w taste for leisure individual binds, so must the non-negativity constraint on the other type of low-ability individuals. However, in all possible outcomes when d = 0, the low-ability individuals have a marginal rate of substitution less than one, so they have positive marginal tax rates. As well, the average tax rates can be increasing, decreasing, or constant across individuals of di ering tastes and/or ability a s it is in the standard case.
For any given y1 > 0, the imposition of work requirements on the low-ability, low taste for leisure individuals increases the amount of labour high-ability individuals have to supply to mimic, by the amount of the work requirements.
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It is possible that 
Regardless of the preferences of the high ability individuals, (5) can never be positive, given the assumptions made. Only if the worst-o individuals were more productive at 22 Given that the government can observe the labour supplied at workfare, the high-ability individuals will have to supply d1 + y1 w2 to mimic. 23 Throughout the analysis, the optimality of imposing workfare on one type of low-ability individual is examined while assuming that there is no workfare being imposed on the other type. However, the results carry through if there is positive a m o u n t being imposed on the other type. workfare than they are in the private market, w > w 1 , could their welfare beincreased by imposing work requirements on them.
Suppose instead that the government is initially requiring workfare from the low ability individuals with a low disutility of labour. The government's objective function is unchanged, except d h 1 = 0 and d1 > 0. To examine the e ect of a change of d1 on the welfare of the high disutility of labour, low-ability individuals, di erentiate the Lagrangian with respect to d1:
To examine the optimality of imposing a non-productive work requirement, evaluate (6) at d1 = w = 0 :
The sign of (7) ), and (8) is necessarily negative. However, if the high ability individuals have a high disutility of labour, then it is uncertain which term is larger, and therefore, the sign of (7) is ambiguous. Imposing a non-productive work requirement on the low disutility of labour, low-ability individuals can improve the welfare of the worst-o individuals when the high ability individuals also have a high disutility of labour.
To determine the optimality of a productive work requirement, use the rst-order condition on y1 and evaluate (6) The second term on the right-hand side of (9) represents the e ect of the imposition of workfare on the self-selection constraint between the high ability and low ability, low disutility of labour individuals and is necessarily non-negative, so w < w 1 . This is also the necessary condition for workfare to be welfare-improving under the assumption of di ering abilities only. Brett (1997) derives this condition in the two-ability case when the government maximizes a general, quasiconcave social welfare function. 24 However, if is optimal not to have the low-ability, low disutility of labour individuals working in the private labour market, then this critical level will necessarily behigher and possibly greater than w 1 .
In summary, imposing non-productive or productive work requirements on the lowability individuals with a high disutility o f labour makes them worse o . However, they can bemade bettero if non-productive workfare is required from the other type of low ability individuals when high ability individuals have a high disutility of labour. They can also bemade better o , regardless of the preferences of the high ability individuals, when workfare is more productive than some critical level, which can be less than the productivity level of low-ability individuals in the private labour market. 24 Following Besley and Coate (1995) , Brett assumes U is linear. He also allows private labour and work requirements to be imperfect substitutes in the disutility of labour function. The condition on the productivity of workfare become more (less) stringent the more (less) onerous work requirements are relative t o w ork in the private market.
High-Taste for Leisure as a Form of`Laziness'
In this case, individuals with a high taste for leisure are assumed to bebetter o in the laissez-faire outcome than individuals of the same ability, but with a lower taste for leisure. The government maximizes the welfare of the low-ability, l o w-taste for leisure individuals with respect to the three transfer bundles and subject to the resource constraint, the non-negativity constraint o n t h e p r i v ate income of the low-ability individuals and the selfselection constraints. In this case, the self-selection constraint between the high ability individuals the low-ability, high taste for leisure individuals is not binding and can be ignored. The Lagrangian for the government's problem is: If there are no work requirements and the low-ability, high taste for leisure individuals earn a positive private income, h = 0, they will also have a zero marginal tax rate. If h > 0, then their marginal rate of substitution between consumption and income will be greater than one. However, by de nition their marginal rate of substitution evaluated at L = 0 is less than one. They optimally supply their laissez-faire amount of labour when d h 1 = 0 . As in the previous case, if the non-negativity constraint is binding for the low taste for leisure, low-ability individuals, then it must also bind for the high taste for leisure, low-ability individuals.
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This means the worst-o individuals optimally supply some labour in the private market and the sign of their optimal marginal tax rate faced is ambiguous. It can be positive, negative, or zero. In Figure 4 , the case when the low-ability, low-taste for leisure individuals have a negative marginal tax rate is shown. Irrespective of the sign of the marginal tax rate faced by these individuals, the average tax rate for the low-ability individuals is increasing in taste. That is, individuals with a higher taste for leisure have a higher average tax rate. The optimal tax schedule is regressive in this region.
The imposition of workfare increases the marginal rate of substitution of the mimickers and thereby, increases the likelihood that the worst-o individuals face a negative marginal tax rate.
Initially, it is assumed the government imposes workfare only on the worst-o individuals, d1 > 0 and d (10) Evaluating (10) at d1 = w = 0 determines whether non-productive work requirements 25 The proof is given in the previous section. 
The sign of (11) ). Non-productive work requirements can be optimal to impose. This result di ers from the one derived by Besley and Coate (1995) . In their model, individuals di er with respect to ability only and non-productive w orkfare is never optimal to impose.
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Their results can be generated in this model by assuming that the selfselection constraint between the two low-ability individuals does not bind, 1 = 0, and that the high ability individuals have a l o w t a s t e for leisure. Expression (11) 
which is necessarily negative. The disutility l o w ability individuals receive from ful lling positive work requirements, as represented by the rst term on the left-hand side of (12), is greater than the utility they receive from the additional resources created by the weakening of the self-selection constraint between individuals of di ering ability, as represented by the second term on the left-hand side of (12). Non-productive w orkfare is never optimal to impose. However, in general, when individuals have di erent preferences non-productive w orkfare can be optimal. Work requirements also serve t o w eaken the selfselection constraint between individuals of di ering tastes, as represented by the middle term on the left-hand side of (11).
Suppose instead that workfare is productive. To examine the optimality o f imposing productive w orkfare on the low-ability, l o w taste for leisure individuals, use the rst-order condition on y1, a n d evaluate (10) at w > 0 a n d d1 = 0 . ) ; w 1 ` ( 13) Given the low-taste for leisure, low-ability individuals optimally supply some private labour, `= 0, then imposing workfare on them increases their welfare when w > w , where w is given by (9). Productive workfare can be optimal if it is weakening the self-selection constraint between individuals of di ering ability.
Suppose the government is initially requiring workfare from the other type of lowability individuals. The problem is identical to the one above, except d1 = 0 a n d d 
Work requirements imposed on the low ability individuals with a high-taste for leisure can never bewelfare improving when w w 1 . In summary, imposing non-productive or productive w ork requirements on the worsto individuals can improve their welfare. However, they will never by made better o if non-productive or productive work requirements are imposed on the low-ability individuals with a high taste for leisure.
Discussion
The innovation in this paper is the allowance for individuals to di er with respect to their preferences, as well as with respect to their abilities. What implications does heterogeneity of preferences have for the optimality o f w orkfare in a nonlinear income tax scheme? First is the issue of the interpretation of preferences. It is possible that the government might want to redistribute towards or away from the lowest income earner. To allow for these two possibilities, the government is seen to interpret a high disutility o f labour as either a type of disability or a form of`laziness'. In each case, the government redistributes between the two t ypes of low-ability individuals with the direction of redistribution being determined by the government's interpretation of preferences. Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) showed that along the second-best pareto e ciency frontier, 27 when individuals di er with respect to their preferences, self-selection constraints between the two t ypes of individuals can only bind in one direction. They also show it can bind in either direction along the pareto e ciency frontier. However, in order to select the optimal point on the frontier some interpersonal comparison of the individuals utility m ust bemade. The di erent interpretations of preferences is used to motive the comparison of utilities and therefore, the direction of redistribution.
Second is the issue of who should be required to work. As argued above, the government will never optimally impose workfare on the high ability individuals. When individuals di er in ability o n l y , the choice facing the government is whether or not to imposeworkfare on the low-ability individuals. When low-ability individuals have di erent preferences, the choice then becomes whether or not to impose workfare on low-ability individuals, and on which type of low-ability individual to impose it upon. It was shown that requiring workfare from low-ability, high-disutility of labour individuals is never optimal, but that it can be optimal to impose workfare on low-ability individuals with a low disutility o f labour.
Insight i n to the above results can be gained by considering what workfare is e ectively doing. Recall, any increase in the amount of resources available to be redistributed to the worst-o individuals always makes them better o . There are two ways workfare can make this happen. First, workfare is productive and creates additional resources. Second, workfare weakens the self-selection constraints between di erent types of individuals, allowing the government to extract more revenue from the high-ability persons. This implies that if workfare is not productive, then the only way it can increase welfare is if the second condition holds.
The third implication of heterogeneity of preferences is that workfare is never optimal when all individuals have the same ability, unless they are more productive at workfare than they are in the private market. This is the result derived by Beaudry and Blackorby (1997) . In their model, individuals di er with respect to two unobservables, home sector and formal sector productivities, 28 and the government can observe both income earned and hours worked in the formal (tax-paying) sector. E ectively, the only unobservable is home sector productivities, which can begiven the interpretation as taste for leisure. They show t h a t w ork requirements can only be optimal if individuals are more productive at workfare than they are in the formal sector.
To see this result, assume that the self-selection constraints between the high ability and low ability individuals never bind, 2 = 0 in subsection 3.1 and 3.2. Then the Lagrangians with respect to the levels of workfare when the government imposes workfare on either type of the low-ability individuals, and in both subsections reduce to: A necessary condition for them to be positive is that the low ability individuals have a higher productivity i n w orkfare than they do in the private market. Workfare is never optimal to impose when individuals di er only with respect to their tastes for labour, irrespective of the amount of private labour they supply. In this case, all individuals have the same opportunity cost of supplying labour for workfare and workfare cannot weaken the self-selection constraint b e t ween the two types of individuals.
This paper shows that workfare can separate individuals of the same taste, when it is also being used to separate individuals of di ering ability. From (11), it can be seen that imposing non-productive w orkfare on low-ability, l o w taste for leisure individuals reduces the incentive of both the low-ability, high taste for leisure individuals and the high-ability individuals to mimic them.
In summary, when individuals di er with respect to both ability and preferences, and the government interprets a high disutility of labour as some form of disability, then imposing non-productive or productive w orkfare on the worst-o individuals never makes them better o . On the other hand, if the government interprets a high disutility of labour as a form of`laziness', then imposing non-productive work requirements on the low-ability, low-taste for leisure individuals can increase their welfare. However, their welfare will decrease if non-productive or productive work requirements are imposed on the low-ability individuals with a high taste for leisure.
Using either interpretation of disutility of labour, it was shown that productive w orkfare can be optimal to use in a non-linear, income taxation framework only if it imposed on individuals with a low disutility of labour, or if low-ability individuals are more productive at workfare than they are in the private labour market.
Conclusion
When the government cares about the disutility that individuals receive f r o m w orking and individuals have di erent preferences, then workfare can beoptimal only if it is imposed on individuals with a lower disutility o f labour. It was assumed that workfare can never bemore productive than the private sector productivity of the individuals it is imposed upon. If this was not the case, then workfare would always be optimal to implement e v en under perfect information.
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The results derived in this paper suggest greater investigation is needed into how individuals actually di er. If one could argue that the majority of potential welfare recipients have similar educational backgrounds, then workfare will not screen individuals with di erent preferences. In this case, instituting workfare in the welfare system will only increase administrative costs. Likewise, individuals will not be made better o under the realistic assumption that individuals are not any more productive in workfare programs, which typically involve menial or community service jobs, than they are in the private market.
The issue of the interpretation of disutility of labour has also been raised. When individuals have di erent preferences and the government is welfaristic then some form of interpersonal comparison of utilities must be made. Instead of assuming a complete ordering of utilities, this paper used the possible interpretations of a high disutility of labour to motivate the cardinalization of laissez-faire utilities. By assuming a complete aversion to inequality, the extreme case of redistribution was examined under the di erent interpretations of preferences. However, adopting any other quasi-concave objective function would not change the results. These results are interesting, especially in lieu of the publicized belief that individuals on welfare are`lazy' and requiring them to work will force them back i n to the formal sector. This paper showed that even when the government does not want to redistribute income to such individuals it is never optimal to impose workfare on them.
On the other hand, if these individuals are believed to be disabled, the government would also not want to impose workfare on them. However, this paper has ignored the existence of some formal`tagging' mechanism to identify disabled individuals. In most welfare systems there exists such a mechanism and it would be interesting to model it within a workfare program to see if`tagging' individuals reduces the cost of the transfer system and increases welfare. In addition, it would be interesting to see if the results change by allowing for workfare that enhances participants' earning ability through jobtraining and education.
The possibility that individuals earn unobservable income, or collect more than one welfare cheque has also been ignored. This is typical of the fraudulent behaviour in the welfare system that the government is concerned about, and it would beilluminating to have a model that could account for these activities. 
